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Caveat Venditor:
Constructive Eviction and
Implied Warranties in
Leasing
by Stuart R. Blatt & Nicholas Nunzio
Under common law, when land was leased to a tenant, the lease was considered equivalent to a sale of the
premises for a term. There was no implied covenant of
habitability or fitness for use and the rule of caveat emptor applied. In modern leasing transactions, however,
"the landlord is not in the business of leasing space, 1period, but in the business of leaing habitable space.."
Consequently, absent express covenants, courts have
employed the doctrines of constructive eviction and implied warranty of habitability to avoid the rigidity of the
common law.
CAVEAT EMPTOR
Rules of property law solidified before the development of mutually dependent covenants in contract law.
Theoretically, there were no further unexecuted acts to
be performed by the landlord, once an estate was
leased. There could be no failure of consideration, with
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the result that there existed no implied warranty of habitability or fitness for use of the leased premises. 2 The
teant's promise to pay was exchanged only for the
bare right of possession. Once the landlord delivered
possession and thereafter did not interfere with that possession, use or enjoyment of the premises, the landlord's
part of the agreement was completed.3
In the absence of fraud or active concealment on the
part of the landlord, there was no covenant or implied
warranty that the premises would be tenantable, fit or
suitable for the use for which the lessee required them:
habitation, occupation, business, or cultivation.
The rule of caveat emptor in lease transactions may
have had some basis in social practice. In an agrarian,
non-industrial age, a tenant, more often than not, could
walk the land and determine for himself its fitness for his
purpose. Both landlord and tenant possessed a generally equal knowledge of the condition of the land.
Usually the land itself would yield both rents to the lessor and returns to the lessee. The buildings were incidental and constructed simply without such modern
1 Quinn

and Phillips, The Law of Landlord Tenant: A CriticalEualua-

tion of the Past with GuidelinesFor the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV.
225, 254 (1969). (hereinafter Quinn and Phillips
2 Modern status of existence of implied warranty of habitability or
fitness for use of leased premises, see 40 A.L.R.3d 646.
Quinn and Phillips, 254.

4
conveniences as wiring or plumbing.
In a more complex, industrial society, however, the
vast majority of tenants do not reap the rents directly
from the land, but bargain primarily for the right to enjoy the premises, especially buildings thereon. The common law conceptions of a lease and the tenant's liability
for the rent are no longer viable. Tenants are often required to sign standardized leases with no means of ascertaining the true condition of the premises. "The lessor is in a better position to know of latent structural
defects in a building which might go unnoticed by the
inspecting lessee since the plans
and specifications are
5
not in the latter's possession."
In a re-evaluation of the doctrine of caveat emptor,
the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated in Reste Realty
6
Corp. v. Cooper:
It has come to be recognized that ordinarily the lessee
does not have as much knowledge of the condition of the
premises as the lessor. A prospective lessee, such as a
small businessman, cannot be expected to know if the
plumbing or wiring systems are adequate or confirm to local codes. Nor should he be expected to hire experts to
advise him. Ordinarily all this information should be readily available to the lessor who in turn can inform the prospective lessee. These factors have produced persuasive
arguments for re-evaluation of the caveat emptor doctrine
and for imposition of an implied warranty that the premises are suitable for the lease's purposes and conform to
local codes and zoning laws.
This view, thoroughly integrated into New Jersey
law, 7 represents an aspect of the modern trend away
from caveat emptor.

CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION
To avoid the rigidity of caveat emptor, some courts
have employed the remedy of constructive eviction.
Earlier, courts held that the implied covenant of quiet
enjoyment was violated only by actual eviction, in which
the tenant was physically removed. Later, courts began
to recognize that quiet enjoyment could be violated by
the landlord's interference with the tenant's use and enjoyment of the property without the tenant actually being expelled. Known as constructive eviction, 8 this principle provides that any disturbance of the tenant's
possession by the landlord rendering the premises unfit
for the purpose for which they were leased or depriving

the tenant of their beneficial enjoyment, thereby causing
him to abandon them amounts to constructive eviction.
The tenant9 must abandon the premises within a reasonable time.
Maryland law states that unless the lease provides otherwise, there shall be an implied covenant by the lessor
that the lessee has a right to quiet enjoyment of the
property. " In Maryland, the tenant is deemed constructively evicted and thus relieved of his leasehold obligations under the following circumstances:
Premises Rendered Unfit. It must be shown that the landlord has committed some act or failed to perform some
service owing to the tenant which has rendered the premises unfit for the use intended. Interference with the
tenant's possession and enjoyment of the property must
be substantial.
Notification. The landlord must be notified by the tenant
as to the condition of the premises.
Abandonment. The tenant must abandon the premises
within a reasonable time after the misconduct complained
of. If the tenant fails to abandon promptly, he waives his
rights. 11
In the case of residential leases, the Maryland legislature has provided various remedies when 12
possession is
not delivered at the beginning of the term:
9 49 AM. JUR. Landlord and Tenant §301 (1970).
§2-115 (1974).

0 MD. REAL PROPERTY CODE ANN.

" Shapiro, Graham and Bregman, Commercial and Residential
Leases, The Law and the Negotiation, MICPEL 11 (1978).
12 MD. REAL PROPERTY CODE ANN. §8-204.
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move. 16 In view of these modern urban realities, some
courts reject the doctrine of caveat emptor, and recognize the existence of an implied warranty of habitability
or fitness for use of leased premises.

The rent shall abate until possession is delivered. The tenant, upon written notice to the landlord before possession
is delivered, may terminate the lease. The landlord must
return all security deposits. Regardless of whether the
lease is terminated, the landlord is liable for consequential
damages suffered by the tenant. 13
In New York in the case of Barash v. Pennsylvania
Terminal Real Estate Corp.,1 4 the rule that recourse to
constructive eviction was applicable to commercial
leases as well as to residential leases was clearly enunciated.
In practice, however, this doctrine is not an adequate
solution for the aggrieved tenant, since he must assume
the risk of being held liable for the accrued rent if it is
later determined that the defects in the premises were
not sufficient to constitute a constructive eviction. 15 An
even more serious objection to the adequacy of the
remedy lies in the realities of modern urban leasing: a
-tenant may be unable to abandon the premises because
of a critical shortage of space. Without abandonment,
most courts have refused to find a constructive eviction.
Furthermore, a tenant may not be able to afford such a
13

Shapiro, Graham and Bregman, op.cit., MICPEL 10.
N.Y. 2d 77, 308 NY.S.2d 649 (1970), and see, Grabenhorstv.
Nicodemus, 42 Md. 236 (1875).
15
Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969).
1426

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
Application of such an implied warranty gives recognition to the changes in leasing transactions today, and affirms the fact that a lease is, in essence, a sale and, more
importantly, a contractual relationship. The doctrine has
counterparts in the law of sales and of torts. Candidly
countenanced, it is compelled by the nature of the transaction and contemporary 7housing realities, to achieve a
just and necessary result.'
Recognizing the limitations of outmoded legal principles and inadequate remedies, progressive jurisdictions
have begun to apply warranties of fitness and habitability in urban residential leases. 18 The implied warranty of
habitability may be used as a defense in both actions for
possession and actions for rent if the tenant is able to
show that a substantial violation of the housing code existed during the period rent was withheld. In addition,
the tenant may have an affirmative cause of action
against the landlord for breach of contract. 19 The tenant,
however, may still remain liable
for the reasonable value
20
of the use of the premises.
In Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,2 1 suit was
brought by a landlord seeking to repossess leased premises where the tenants had ceased paying rent. The
tenant's refusal to pay rent was based upon the
landlord's failure to maintain the premises in a habitable
16Marini v. Ireland, 36 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (1970).
17

Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470, 474.
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961), but
cf.,
Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis.2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970); Kline
v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Jack Spring, Inc. v.
Little, 50 lll.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200
N.W. 791 (Iowa, 1972); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway,
Mass., 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973). King v. Moorehead, 492 S.W.2d 65
(Mo. App., 1973); Foisy v. Wyman. 83 Wash.2d 22, 515 P.2d 160
(1973); Fritz v. Wamthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973);
Steele v. Latimore, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Green v.
Superior Court, 10 Cal.3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1974); Old Town Development Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744
(Ind. App. 1976); Kaplan v. Coulston, 85 Misc.2d 745, 381
N.Y.S.2d 634 (1976); Fair v. Negley, 390 A.2d 240 (Pa.Super.
1978).
'9E.g., Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.Y. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
20 Damages for breach of the implied warranty of habitability are
usually calculated to be the difference between the contractual rent
and the fair market value of the defective premises. See, e.g., Green
v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.3d 616, 638-39. 517 P.2d 1168, 1183,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 719 (1974). The New Jersey court in Academy
Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 NJ.Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970)
reduced the rent by a percentage corresponding to the dimunition
in the use and enjoyment of the premises caused by the landlord's
breach.
21428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925
(1970), at 1072 and 1082.
18

condition, evidenced by numerous housing code violations. The court, applying their decision solely to residential leases, reaffirmed contractual rights, stating:
The warranty of habitability, measured by the standard
set out in the housing regulations for the District of Columbia, is implied by operation of law in all leases,
whether oral or written, and for all types of tenancies of
urban dwelling units covered by those regulations; breach
of warranty gives rise to the usual remedies for breach of
contract.
Further:
The tenant's obligation to pay rent is dependent on the
landlord's performance of his obligation, including an implied warranty to maintain the premises in a habitable
condition.
Although the current trend involves the rights and
remedies of residential tenants, the doctrine espoused in
Reste Realty clearly recognizes similar grievances experienced by commercial tenants, especially small businessmen. Here the New Jersey Supreme Court first recognized the necessity for more contract oriented analysis of
lease agreements and announced the implied warranty
of habitability
doctrine in a commercial leasehold set22
ting.
Adoption of the view that a lease is essentially a contractual relationship with an implied warranty of habitability and fitness makes a more consistent and responsive set of basic contract remedies available for a tenant,
including damages, reformation, and rescission, and
provide a wide range of alternatives in resolving tenant
grievances.23
In Maryland, generally, there is no implied warranty of
habitability in residential leases. However, Baltimore
City residents may invoke breach of implied warranty of
habitability.
In any written or oral lease or agreement for rental of a
dwelling intended for human habitation, the landlord shall
be deemed to covenant and warrant that the dwelling is
fit for human habitation. If the dwelling is not fit for human habitation, the tenant is entitled to the followingremedies:
An action for breach of contract or warranty which
may include a prayer for rescission of the contract.
Rescission of the contract including the return of all
deposits and money towards rent paid during the
period of the breach of warranty of habitability.
The warranty of habitability is a continuing warranty and
the tenant may maintain an action for breach of this warranty at any time during the tenancy if the dwelling becomes unfit for human habitation.
No action for breach of warranty may be maintained unless the landlord has notice or knowledge of the condi-

tions which24constitute the alleged breach of warranty of

habitability.
In Maryland, however, there is a limited warranty
"that the premises will be made available in a condition
permitting habitation, with reasonable safety. ... " This
provision may be modified or excluded by the lease and
is applicable only if the landlord "offers more than four
dwelling units for rent on one parcel of property at25one
location and.., rents by means of written leases."
The 1975 enactment of Maryland's Rent Escrow Statute 2 6 exemplifies far reaching reform in landlord-tenant
law. The statute works as an initiative to compel the
landlord to correct deficiencies in the property, or a defense against the landlord's request for back rent and
eviction.
In the case of serious and dangerous defects which
exist within a residential unit, i.e., lack of heat, light,
electricity, or hot or cold running water; lack of adequate
sewage disposal facilities; infestation of rodents in two or
more dwelling units; the existence of paint containing
lead pigment on surfaces within the dwelling unit; the
existence of any structural defect; or the existence of any
condition which represents a health or fire hazard to the
dwelling unit, the tenant shall notify the landlord in writing of the defects. If the landlord fails or refuses to repair
or correct the conditions, the tenant may bring an action
to pay rent into the court in escrow because of the defects or conditions, thirty days after the landlord is notified.
The court may order the termination of the lease and
return of the leased premises to the landlord, subject to
the tenant's right of redemption; order that the rent be
paid into escrow; and/or order that the amount of rent
be reduced to represent the value of the premises with
the conditions or defects.
After establishing rent escrow, the court has several alternatives, including: an order that the money be disbursed to the landlord after the necessary repairs have
been made; an order that the escrow account be paid
the tenant, or landlord, or to any appropriate person or
agency for the purpose of making necessary repairs; appointment of a special administrator who shall cause the
repairs to be made; or an order that the money be paid
to the tenant if repairs are not made within six months. If
the tenant defaults on payment into the escrow account,
the account can be disbursed to the landlord.
24

2s

22 Contra Service Oil Co., Inc. v. White, 218 Kan. 87, 542 P.2d 652

(1975); Coulston v. Telescope Productions,Ltd. (S.Ct.), 85 Misc.2d
23

339, 378 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1975).

Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470, 475.

Baltimore City Code of Public Local Laws, Art. 4 of the Public Local Laws of Maryland, Landlord and Tenant 9-14.1 and (-14.2
(Supp. 1978).
MD.REAL PROPERTY CODE ANN. §8 203.1 (a)(2)(i) (Supp. 1980).
Furthermore, the lease must set forth "[tlhe landlord's and tenant's
specific obligations as to heat, gas, electricity, water and repair of the
premises." Waiver is not permitted.

26 MD.REAL PROPERTY CODE ANN.

§8-211 (Supp. 1980).
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CONCLUSION
One basic premise found in all recent decisions adopting an implied warranty of habitability is the contention
that the doctrine of caveat emptor cannot stand, even
on its own terms, in today's leasing transactions. The
theoretical meaning of a lease has no relevancy in the
modern leasing situation and should be replaced with
realistic concepts. Indeed, the rights of tenants have
been broadened, the courts are now viewing leases in
the light of caveat venditor.
The author is a practicing attorney in Maryland and
Washington D.C., with the firm of Blatt Rosenberg-Blatt.
He received his B.A. from the State University of New
York in 1966, he J.D. from University of Baltimore in
1969, and undertook post-graduate studies at George
Washington University.

Note: On the weekend of March 15, 1981, a represent
ative group of women employees of the United Nations
in New York, dressed in black, appeared to present their
complaint that about 80% of them had been harassed
with demands for sexual favors in return for promotion
or continued employment. Kurt Waldheim's response
was that he would have preferred to have seen them
dressed in pink.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
MARYLAND RULE 782 (c) may not be used
by prosecution as a plea bargain substitute - State v. Limbo, An Imaginary
Opinion by the Court of Appeals of Maryland
By Harold D. Norton
Opinion by Forthright, J.
We granted certiorari in this case to examine a long
standing procedure which, while serving a legitimate role
in the criminal justice system in some instances, may
lack sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent its use as
a tool of prosecutorial oppression. The issue, whether
Maryland Rule 782(c) might allow the state to place a
charge on stet' in return for a defendant's cooperation
in an investigation, and later reinstitute the charge regardless of the defendant's subsequent conduct, has not
yet been addressed by this court.
In MD.R.P. 782(c) Disposition by stet is explained.
"Upon motion by the State's Attorney, the court may
postpone trial indefinitely upon a charging document by
marking the case 'stet' on the docket."
When a case is stetted, all further action is held in
abeyance. Outstanding warrants which would lead to arrest or detention of the defendant are recalled or revoked. MD.R.P. (d). At the request of either party a stetted case may be rescheduled for trial within one year of
the stet and thereafter only by court order for good
cause shown. MD.R.P. 782(c).
The state candidly admits the facts as stated by petitioner, Limbo. Limbo was indicted for receiving stolen
goods2 on July 2, 1978. The prosecuting attorney proposed, through defense counsel, that Limbo cooperate
with the police by "identifying certain members" of a
fencing operation. In return for this cooperation, the
prosecutor promised to place the theft indictment on stet
docket. The stet was entered in open court on October
3, 1978. The defendant was not advised that he had
waived his right to a speedy trial (in the event the
charges were rescheduled) by accepting the stet. See
Fowler v. State, 18 Md. App. 37, 350 A.2d 20 (1973).
Judicial inquiry into the reason a case is being placed on
stet docket is not required by MD.R.P. 782(c) and none
was made.
The defendant was not present at the hearing. Nor
was he required to be by Rule 782(c). The rule requires
only that notice be sent to the defendant and his counsel
of record.
Within the next nine months, the police had successfully infiltrated the fencing operation. The state maintained that their success was due to independent investigation although Limbo had given the police "a few

names". On October 2, 1979, the stetted charge against
Limbo was rescheduled. Limbo was subsequently found
guilty and sentenced to ten years imprisonment pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 §466.
At trial the state explained that the charge was stetted
on the docket because information was to be supplied
by Limbo and the prosecution needed the threat of reinstitution of the charge as an incentive. Had the state
nolle prosequied the charge instead, the indictment
would have been cancelled. Brady v. State, 26 Md.
App. 283, 374 A.2d 613 (1977). In MD.R.P. 782(a) a
State's Attorney may terminate a prosecution on a
charging document and dismiss the charge at his discretion, by entering a nolle prosequi on the record in open
court, with a statement of the reasons. The defendant
need not be present. Notice will be sent to defendant
and his counsel.
When nolle prosequi has been entered all pretrial release conditions are terminated and bail posted by the
defendant on those charges shall be released. MD.R.P.
782(b).
The state contended that Limbo could not complain
because he voluntarily accepted the risk that the state
might reschedule the charge at its discretion within one
year. While we realize that Rule 782(c), in its present
form, allows the state to reschedule a stetted charge
within one year, we are convinced that this procedure
violates the requirement of fundamental fairness assured
by the Maryland Constitution, Article XXIII, and The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
A plea bargain was not used under Rule 733 because
the state wished "to keep [its] options open."
Traditionally a "plea bargain" requires a plea of guilty
or nolo contendre to one or more charges upon the
condition that the state make some concession in regard
to those or other pending charges. Gray v. State, 38
Md. App. 343, 380 A.2d 1071 (1974). When a prosecutor makes a promise that serves as consideration or inducement for a plea, that promise must be fulfilled and
may be specifically enforced by the defendant. Kisamore
v. State, 286 Md. 654, 409 A.2d 719 (1980). The
standard to be applied is one of fair play and equity under the facts and circumstances of the case, and where
an agreement has been reached, it would be a grave error to permit the prosecution to repudiate its promises
where the defendant is willing to perform, but because
of some action taken by the prosecution, is unable.
State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 698-99, 357 A.2d
376, 383-84 (1976); see generally 9 U. Bait. L. Rev.
295 (1980), on plea bargain. We see no constitutional
significance between a traditional plea bargain and the
case at hand.
The stet procedure may be used as an inducement for

investigatory cooperation. A prosecutor may promise
not to reschedule a stetted case so long as the defendant
cooperates with the authorities. The defendant's fear
that a charge may be rescheduled acts to insure his cooperation. In light of the standards imposed by other existing procedures and the need for the state to appear
open and fair in its dealings with defendants, we believe
that Rule 782 (c) cannot stand in its present form.
We first note that Rule 733 provides a detailed procedure that must accompany a plea agreement involving a
plea of guilty or nolo contendre. The judge must be advised of the terms of the agreement, which he may accept or reject, and, most importantly, all proceedings
pursuant to the agreement must be stated on the record.
MD.R.P. 733(c). Therefore, when a question arises concerning the obligations of either party, MD.R.P. 733(d)
acts as a plea bargain "Statute of Frauds", with the
agreement reduced to a writing.
No similar safeguards exist under MD.R.P. 782(c). Entry of stet requires a pro forma motion by the state; the
trial judge need not be made aware of any underlying
agreement; the state may unilaterally reschedule the
charge for trial at any time within one year without explanation; only after a year is "good cause" required to
reschedule. Rule 782(c) seems to provide a presumption
that neither party is prejudiced by rescheduling a stetted
charge within one year. We see in this case, however,
that circumstances other than passage of time may prejudice a criminal defendant to the extent that it would be
unfair to reinstitute the charge, e.g., production of selfincriminating evidence or witnesses. In addition, the in-
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tegrity of the judiciary is injured whenever the state is
seen as promising that which it need not deliver.
Because of these shortcomings, MD.R.P. 782 would
be amended by this court to provide the following safeguards when a charge is placed on stet docket with
defendant's consent: first, that the defendant be present;
second, that the trial judge be fully advised of the reasons for the entry of the stet; third, that the trial judge
consent; fourth, that the defendant be told that by accepting the stet, he waives his right to a speedy trial;
fifth, that the proceeding fully appear on the record to
the same extent as MD.R.P. 733; and last, that the state
be required to show "good cause" whenever a stetted
charge is sought to be rescheduled.
CONVICTION VACATED: CASE REMANDED FOR
HEARING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION
Concurring opinion by Dictum, J.
I can foresee no situation which would require the use
of a stet, instead of other existing procedures. In my
opinion, the stet procedure is too unpredictable and indefinite to be used in criminal prosecutions where less
suspect means are available to achieve similar ends.
For example, where a busy prosecutor has a defendant before a court and is unable, for one reason or another, to proceed, he may ask that the case be stetted.
At first this seems perfectly reasonable since the defendant may still request that the case be tried. Where the
defendant is present, stet may not be entered, under

Rule 782(c), without his consent. As a practical matter,
the state would then be forced to either nolle prosequi
the charge or ask for postponement. Where postponement is proper, the state Would be forced to prepare its
case. Where postponement would not be allowed, a
nolle prosequi would provide a final determination of
the charge. In both instances, the merits of the charge
are more strictly scrutinized, and a final determination
assured. If a charge cannot be proven, society's interests
are vindicated through the nolle prosequi. If a charge
can be proven, but at a later time, society's interested
are vindicated by a trial on the merits. Remove the option of stetting the case and something more is precluded: the possibility that a guilty person may never be
tried or that an innocent person be subject to "the cloud
of an unliquilated criminal charge" for one year's time.
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S 213, 226-227
(1966) (concurring opinion). The solution to a large
number of valid charges being entered nolle prosequi is
not to allow the prosecutor to act as a judge and set the
case on the back burner, but to put a greater emphasis
on being ready with the case the first time. For these
reasons, I have no reservation in striking down Rule
782, in its present form, as an anachronism which has
outlived its usefulness.
' See MD.R.P. 782 (1980).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 §466 (1976 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 1978), recodified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 §342 (1976 Repl. Vol. & Supp.
1980).
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